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the Court has not declared any of the practices that Bork targeted legal per se, its decisions have substantially narrowed the practical scope of potential liability for these practices. 12 Thirty-five years after the publication of The Antitrust Paradox, antitrust conservatives in general continue to support Bork's program of focusing antitrust on anticompetitive horizontal price fixing and market division and horizontal mergers leading to monopoly or duopoly, while circumscribing or abandoning antitrust's concern with small horizontal mergers, price discrimination, and exclusionary conduct. 13 To defend those views, and to support their advocacy of further modifications to antitrust rules, conservatives frequently adopt a decision-theoretic framework often termed "error cost" analysis. That framework was first employed in the law and economics literature by Richard Posner during the 1970s 14 and introduced into mainstream antitrust scholarship by Paul Joskow and Alvin Klevorick in 1979. 15 Modern antitrust commentators often reference Frank Easterbrook's adoption of the framework in a widely cited article published in 1984. 16 School antitrust program but not directly targeting the practices Judge Bork singled out include Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977) (introducing the antitrust injury doctrine), and Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979) (limiting the per se prohibition against horizontal price fixing to naked restraints). See generally Baker, supra note 2, at 66-67 (brief survey of Chicago-influenced doctrinal changes). 12 Plaintiffs rarely succeed today when attacking non-price vertical restraints, alleging predatory pricing, or challenging unilateral refusals to deal by dominant firms absent a prior voluntary course of dealing. Vertical mergers are almost never challenged in court. The government largely avoids price discrimination lawsuits under the Robinson-Patman Act, though private enforcement remains active. While the practical scope of liability has narrowed in these areas, it is has not disappeared. See TAKING THE ERROR OUT OF "ERROR COST" ANALYSIS 5
The error cost perspective evaluates antitrust rules-whether considered individually or as a whole-based on whether they minimize total social costs. The relevant costs include costs of "false positives" (finding violations when the conduct did not harm competition), costs of "false negatives" (not finding violations when the conduct harmed competition), and transaction costs associated with use of legal process. 17 False positives and false negatives are harmful to the economy as a whole for reasons that go beyond the conduct in the case under review: 18 False positives and false negatives may chill benefithat "Judge Easterbrook's policy views on error have been enormously influential within the United States," analyzing a range of rules, and concluding that most account appropriately for the balance of rule-specific error costs). Citing Easterbrook's "pioneer [ing] " role in using the error cost approach, Commissioner Joshua Wright describes the use of the approach within antitrust as "distinctively Chicagoan," Wright, supra note 13, at 247-48, without noting Joskow and Klevorick's prior use, supra note 15. 17 These transaction costs go beyond the costs of litigation. They also include, for example, costs associated with information gathering by potential litigants and the institution specifying decision rules. 18 From an economic perspective, antitrust rules benefit society primarily by deterring harmful conduct. See generally Jonathan B. Baker, The Case for Antitrust Enforcement, J. ECON. PERSP., Autumn 2003, at 27; cf. Louis Kaplow, Burden of Proof, 121 YALE L.J. 738 (2012) (highlighting a tradeoff between the benefits of deterrence and costs of chilling beneficial conduct that arises when the burden of proof in adjudication is set to maximize social welfare). Accordingly, the evaluation of error costs must look to the consequences of the decision or legal rule for conduct by other firms, not simply to the incidence of the decision on the parties to the case. For example, restricting analysis to the parties before the court would yield the misimpression that draconian punishments for parking in front of a fire hydrant will eliminate error costs. The prospect of such punishments would lead to 100% compliance with the no-parking rule, so there would be no court cases, no possibility for a court erroneously to convict or acquit a defendant, and no litigation expenditures. Yet such punishments would also chill parking in front of a hydrant when its social benefits (e.g., allowing a doctor to arrive in time to save a life) would outweigh its social costs. Such punishments would also discourage socially beneficial parking near hydrants (by drivers who fear that an aggressive parking enforcer would wrongly conclude that the hydrant is blocked and that a court would uphold the ticket). Restricting analysis to the parties before the court would yield the same misimpression with respect to an enforcement policy taken to the opposite extreme: A complete absence of enforcement of the rule prohibiting parking in front of hydrants would also lead to no court cases, and so would generate no judicial errors and no transaction costs of litigation. Yet such a rule would not deter parking in front of hydrants when the social cost (the cost of impeding fire department access in the event of a fire discounted by the probability that a need for access would arise) would exceed the social benefit. cial conduct by other economic actors (potentially in other industries) that must comply with the rule; these errors may also fail to deter harmful conduct by other economic actors to which the same rule would apply. False positives and false negatives do not neatly map to overdeterrence and underdeterrence, respectively, however, because the deterrence consequences of legal errors depend in part on the way that those errors affect the marginal costs and benefits of conduct undertaken in the shadow of the law. 19 Contemporary antitrust conservatives have relied on the error cost framework to advocate various antitrust rules that would place a "thumb on the scales" in favor of permitting firms to engage in much of the conduct that Judge Bork perceived as beneficial. These rules would, among other things, find a tying violation only when the efficiency benefits offsetting plausible competitive harms are insubstantial; 20 abandon "aggressive" enforcement against vertical restraints unless the loss from false negatives is relatively large; 21 and find monopolization only if anticompetitive effects are "disproportionate" to any associated procompetitive justification. 22 
II. ERRONEOUS ERROR COST ARGUMENTS
The error cost framework can be thought of as using the tools of what economists term "decision theory" 24 to evaluate whether legal rules promote "optimal deterrence" (a term used in the economics of penalties to describe economically efficient outcomes). 25 Like microeconomics generally, decision theory is a neutral tool, not an inherently conservative one. 26 In applying that tool to analyze antitrust rules, however, conservatives have made a series of erroneous assumptions, which have collectively imparted a non-interventionist bias to their conclusions.
Antitrust conservatives do not, of course, all think alike. Some would not subscribe to each of the arguments criticized here, and might dismiss some of tion/130725section5speech.pdf) (proposing to limit the application of FTC Act Section 5 to conduct with disproportionate anticompetitive effects). Commentators have also debated in errorcost terms conservative proposals that courts find exclusionary conduct by dominant firms anticompetitive only if the conduct would be unprofitable but for the exclusion of rivals and the resulting market power. (1970) . Although the "error cost" analysis is conducted in terms of costs, minimizing total social costs is equivalent to maximizing total social benefits, which is more likely how the analysis would be described in the language of decision theory. 25 See ANDREW I. GAVIL, WILLIAM E. KOVACIC & JONATHAN B. BAKER, ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY 1129-35 (2d ed. 2008) (Sidebar 9-7) (surveying the literature on the economics of penalties and its application to antitrust). The magnitude of expected penalties undoubtedly influences firm conduct, so the penalties assigned to antitrust violations necessarily affect the likelihood that antitrust rules will lead to efficient outcomes. Similarly, as discussed below in Part II.A.5, the error costs of any individual substantive antitrust rule also depend upon other rules governing firm behavior and the litigation process. This and other problems that arise in applying the error cost framework to evaluate legal rules are discussed briefly in Baker, supra note 3, at 2178-79. In light of these difficulties, "It is hard to be confident that any particular legal rule will minimize error costs for any of the issues antitrust commentators argue about, like bundled discounts or the unilateral competitive effects of mergers, even with the best of intentions." Id. at 2179. 26 See, e.g., LOUIS KAPLOW, COMPETITION POLICY AND PRICE FIXING (2013) (relying on a decision-theoretic framework to argue that antitrust should employ a broad definition of "agreement" among rivals that would encompass oligopolistic interdependence leading to higher prices); Salop, supra note 22, at 344 (discussing the application of decision theory to Sherman Act § 2 standards). 
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term "self-correcting" in antitrust commentary, 30 though the concept predates him and appears, for example, in Judge Bork's book. 31 The conservative claim that markets self-correct rests in part on an unobjectionable economic premise. 32 If entry is easy, 33 then the exercise of market power will prompt new competitors to emerge. That development would be expected to counteract any exercise of market power, and its prospect may deter the exercise of market power in the first place. 34 Proceeding to the empirical claim that, as anticompetitive conduct causes prices to rise, "new entrants will emerge to alleviate, or even eradicate, the problem," and then to the conclusion that " [l] etting the guilty go free in antitrust is generally a selfcorrecting problem,"
35 however, requires reliance on a second, unstated premise. The unstated premise is that entry will generally prove capable of policing market power in the oligopoly settings of greatest concern in antitrust-or at least prove capable of policing market power with a sufficient frequency, to a sufficient extent, and with sufficient speed to make false positives systematically less costly than false negatives. 30 Easterbrook, supra note 16, at 2-3 (stating that "judicial errors that tolerate baleful practices are self-correcting" because "[m]onopoly is self-destructive" given that "[m]onopoly prices eventually attract entry"); id. at 15 ("A monopolistic practice wrongly excused will eventually yield to competition . . . as the monopolist's higher prices attract rivalry."); accord Wright, supra note 13, at 248 ("[T]he costs of false convictions in the antitrust context are likely to be significantly larger than the costs of false acquittals, since judicial errors that wrongly excuse an anticompetitive practice may eventually be undone by competitive forces attracted by the presence of monopoly rents.").
31 BORK, supra note 1, at 133 (a dominant position conferring market power will "always be eroded" if not based on superior efficiency). 32 The possibility of market self-correction through expansion by existing rivals is addressed in Part II.A.2, below. 33 The antitrust economics literature frequently refers to "ease" of entry and "barriers" to entry, so I have adopted the terms here. These terms mislead, however, to the extent they suggest that entry conditions can be analyzed in the abstract, without reference to a competitive concern. The relevant question for antitrust enforcement and policy is typically whether new competition will counteract or deter competitive harm from the specific business conduct at issue. The answer may vary with the nature of the conduct. 34 Conversely, as antitrust conservatives properly recognize, if entry is not easy, the self-correcting process can work slowly, giving antitrust enforcement a role to play. Easterbrook, supra note 16, at 2 (The "long run may be a long time coming, with loss to society in the interim," so "[t]he central purpose of antitrust is to speed up the arrival of the long run."); Evans & Padilla, supra note 16, at 84 ("We are not suggesting that competition cures all anticompetitive illsonly that the forces of competition, and creative destruction, provide some limitation on the magnitude and duration of monopoly profits."); BORK, supra note 1, at 311 ("Antitrust is valuable because in some cases it can achieve results more rapidly than can market forces" such as entry); cf. Wright, supra note 13, at 245 ("The Chicago School neither assumes nor requires conditions of perfect competition, perfect information, or the absence of transaction costs. The Chicago School accounts for real-world frictions."). 35 Yet there is little reason to believe that entry addresses the problem of market power so frequently, effectively, and quickly as to warrant dismissal of concerns regarding false negatives. The claim that airline markets are "contestable," 36 once pressed in support of limiting antitrust intervention in that industry, is no longer seriously maintained. 37 David Evans and Jorge Padilla support the self-correction claim with examples of near-monopolies that eroded over time, "such as General Motors (automobiles), IBM (computers), RCA (television sets), Kodak (photographic film), Xerox (photocopiers), U.S. Steel (finished steel), and Harley-Davidson (motorcycles)"; it is noteworthy, however, that these firms' dominant positions, while not permanent, generally persisted for decades. 38 The antitrust case law supplies other examples of dominant firms that possessed durable market power.
39
The case law also supplies examples of dominant firms and colluding firms that harmed competition by erecting entry barriers and excluding new rivals, including entrants that sought to introduce new technologies. 40 Microsoft, for example, had durable market power in computer operating systems; it main- 36 In what is termed a "contestable" market, the potential for rapid and inexpensive entry would deter or counteract any exercise of market power, no matter how small the number of 
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TAKING THE ERROR OUT OF "ERROR COST" ANALYSIS 11 tained that power by excluding rivals that offered new technologies (rival Internet browsers and the Java programming language) that threatened to erode the "applications barrier to entry" that protected Microsoft Windows from competition from rival operating systems. 41 The Lorain Journal newspaper protected its monopoly power by impeding the entry of a rival using a new technology, radio. 42 MasterCard and Visa likewise adopted rules that prohibited banks from issuing rival cards with innovative features. 43 Similarly, cartels often last more than a decade even when antitrust enforcement cuts short their duration. A recent study of 81 international cartels convicted in the United States or European Union since 1990-most of which were terminated by an antitrust case-found they had an average duration of more than eight years. 44 Indeed, many cartels have lasted for decades. 45 The many examples of long-lasting dominant firms and cartels, along with the theoretical reasons why the exercise of monopoly power need not be transitory or corrected by new rivals attracted by supracompetitive prices, 46 make clear that the exercise of durable market power should be treated as a serious 41 See generally Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34. 42 "Had the newspaper succeeded, and other newspapers followed suit, it is easy to imagine that few radio stations in regions with a dominant newspaper would have succeeded unless they were owned by the newspaper, slowing the growth of the radio industry." Baker, supra note 7, at 560 (footnote omitted). 43 concern. One cannot simply presume that entry by new competitors will correct the instances of market power that antitrust courts identify.
Markets Self-Correct Because Oligopolies Compete and Cartels Are Unstable
Markets could be self-correcting even absent the threat of entry if markets with only a few participants-even as few as two or three-typically perform competitively. Judge Bork took this view, stating that "[o]ligopolistic structures probably do not lead to significant restrictions of output." 47 This claim would be defensible if firms in oligopoly settings typically respond to efforts by other participants to exercise market power by expanding output or otherwise competing more aggressively-with sufficient speed and to a sufficient extent to counteract or deter any exercise of market power. Then coordinated arrangements like cartels would break down quickly or never form in the first place. 48 But contemporary economic scholarship does not support the assertion that oligopolies typically perform competitively. That assertion is inconsistent with the economic literatures relating market concentration to price elevation in static non-cooperative oligopoly models, 49 relating concentration to cartel stability, 50 and empirically relating market structure to the exercise of market power. 51 It is also inconsistent with the studies finding that many cartels have 47 BORK, supra note 1, at 196. The exercise of market power would be expected to lead to higher prices and reduced output industry-wide when products are homogeneous. The output standard is properly concerned with industry-wide output, not with the output of the firms alleged to have harmed competition, as firms that exercise market power by excluding rivals and raising price could increase their own output even as industry output falls. (Judge Easterbrook erroneously focuses on the output of the firms alleged to have harmed competition in The Limits of Antitrust, supra note 16, at 31.) 48 See POSNER, supra note 1, at 53 ("A clandestine cartel is rife with inducements and temptations to cheating, as is confirmed by the history of actual cartels, which are usually quite unstable even when not forced underground by antitrust enforcement." 56 In the relevant passage from the opinion, Justice Scalia wrote: The mere possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant charging of monopoly prices, is not only not unlawful; it is an important element of the free-market system. The opportunity to charge monopoly prices-at least for a short period-is what attracts "business acumen" in the first place; it induces risk taking that produces innovation and economic growth. To safeguard the incentive to innovate, the possession of monopoly power will not be found unlawful unless it is accompanied by an element of anticompetitive conduct. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 407. Justice Scalia could have made his economic point about the role of appropriability as a spur to innovation without referencing monopolies, and he could have noted that competition also spurs innovation. By not formulating his argument this way, Justice Scalia's rhetoric appears to welcome or defend monopolies. See Andrew I. Gavil This "dynamic competition" defense of concentrated markets, or of conduct allowing firms to create or maintain market power, is unconvincing because it ignores several important ways that greater competition enhances incentives to innovate. It does not account for the roles that pre-innovation product-market competition (which firms can seek to escape through innovation) and competition in innovation itself play in fostering innovation. The defense focuses exclusively on the incentive of firms exercising market power to invest in research and development (R&D) arising from their ability to appropriate the gains from innovation, while ignoring the potentially more significant incentive of those firms to increase R&D investment in response to greater investment by their rivals. 58 Nor does the defense account for empirical evidence that greater competition is commonly more important for enhancing innovation incentives than the greater appropriability that a monopoly could confer. 59 The defense also ignores the ability of firms exercising market power to restrict, deter, or eliminate new forms of competition through exclusionary conduct. 60 To relax antitrust rules on the rationale that one firm is enough for competition, in rapidly changing high-technology markets or otherwise, would undermine innovation incentives under the guise of protecting them. Judge Bork argued that antitrust should not automatically prohibit (by treating as illegal per se) certain exclusionary business practices-including vertical mergers, exclusive dealing contracts, and other restrictions on vertically related firms 61 -in part because doing so would make "the simple arithmetical error of counting the same market power twice."
62 He made a similar argument in advocating per se legality for tying. 63 This basis for declining to challenge dominant-firm behavior is commonly referred to as the theory that there is a "single monopoly profit." Some U.S. courts have cited the single monopoly profit theory as a basis for allowing monopolists to make exclusive vertical agreements. 64 Contemporary conservatives recognize that exceptions to the theory exist; they regard these exceptions as rare and implausible, 65 however, and so effectively accept the single monopoly profit theory in practice.
The "single monopoly profit" theory inverts the claim that markets selfcorrect by taking the view that there is no middle ground: if a single firm somehow manages to exercise monopoly power, notwithstanding the tendency of markets to self-correct, the firm extracts all possible monopoly profits and cannot harm competition further through the exclusionary conduct 61 The "single monopoly profit" claim is most often made when analyzing restrictions that a dominant firm imposes on vertically related firms. Cf. Evans & Padilla, supra note 16, at 77 ("A firm with a monopoly at one level of the [vertical] chain [of production] gets all of the monopoly profit if it charges a monopoly price and everyone else in the chain charges a competitive price.").
62 BORK, supra note 1, at 137-38; see id. at 140 ("When a court assumes that a firm forecloses its rivals without predatory intent and without creating efficiency, the court also assumes that the firm gets 'something more' without noticing it."). 63 Id. at 372 (antitrust law's theory of tying "is merely another example of the discredited transfer-of-power theory"); id. at 380-81 (tying and reciprocal dealing should be legal per se because "we have no acceptable theory of harm," while these practices may benefit competition). under review. 66 If so, an error cost calculus would indicate that prohibiting the practice would bring about no social benefits, only costs. Those costs would presumably include transaction costs of litigation, the possibility that judicially ordered injunctive relief would prevent the firm from achieving efficiencies, and the chilling effect that the precedent might have on other firms' pursuit of similar efficiencies.
The single monopoly profit theory is logically valid as a matter of economic theory only in one extreme case, however. If the monopolist (or coordinating firms acting like a monopolist) has literally no rivals and faces no potential entrants, and if buyers have literally no alternative to the monopolist's products, then the monopolist may indeed be unable to increase the rents it derives from exercising market power through (further) exclusionary conduct. Outside such an exceptional circumstance, though, firms can potentially obtain, extend, or maintain their market power through exclusionary conduct that suppresses the alternatives that were just assumed away: fringe rivalry, potential entry, or buyer ability to mitigate the effects of seller market power by substituting other products. 67 Thus, a dominant firm or group of firms coordinating their strategies can exercise additional market power by excluding 66 Put this way, the single monopoly profit theory bears a family resemblance to an argument discussed in the literature on inferring agreement among rivals from circumstantial evidence: the claim that the fact finder should not infer an agreement among firms that are already coordinating on the ground that it would make no sense for them to risk antitrust liability to reach an agreement that would not markedly augment their profits. ( The welfare consequences of economic models of vertical agreements between an upstream monopolist and downstream oligopolists depend on assumptions about the nature of contracting, such as whether payments take the form of a linear schedule (a specified unit price), whether the seller makes offers on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, actual or potential rivals, leveraging market power to a complementary market, or preventing buyers from economizing on products they can use in variable proportions. 68 In general, therefore, and contrary to the implicit presumption of the single monopoly profit theory, poorly performing markets can grow worse. The potential for competitive harm from exclusionary conduct by a dominant firm cannot be ruled out by appeal to economic theory.
Business Practices Prevalent in Competitive Markets Cannot Harm Competition
The conservative literature employing an error cost framework to evaluate antitrust rules often relies on biased evidence when assessing the likely competitive effects of business practices. The problematic chain of logic begins with the observation, whether derived from casual empiricism or from formal empirical studies, that some forms of business conduct (such as tying, exclusive dealing, and other vertical restraints) are prevalent in competitive markets. 69 The conservative literature mistakenly infers that firms cannot readily use these practices to harm competition, either at all or on balance after accounting for efficiencies, and concludes that antitrust rules should not prohibit such practices. 70 and whether the seller's offer to one distributor can be observed by the distributor's rivals.), available at konkurrensverket.se/t/asp/publications.asp.
68 GAVIL ET AL., supra note 67 (providing examples of scenarios in which the single monopoly profit would not prevent firms from enhancing or maintaining market power through restrictive distribution practices). A dominant firm or coordinating firms can also exercise additional market power through exclusionary conduct that permits the evasion of rate regulation, id., or through conduct that facilitates harmful price discrimination. 69 Cooper et al., supra note 21, at 648 (Empirical studies of vertical restraints find little support for anticompetitive theories and much support for procompetitive theories.); see Hylton & Salinger, supra note 20, at 471 ("[I]n formulating a rule, the prevalence of tying for procompetitive reasons is an important consideration. Because beneficial tying is so pervasive, rules against tying could be harmful even with a small rate of falsely labeling tying as anticompetitive."). Compare McWane, Inc., FTC Docket No. 9351, 2014-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 78,670, at 129,293 (Jan. 30, 2014) (Wright, Comm'r, dissenting) ("With regard to vertical restraints, it is wellaccepted that the economic learning accumulated since GTE Sylvania has taught that such restraints, a category that includes vertical territorial restrictions, resale price maintenance, exclusive dealing, loyalty discounts, tying, and other related business practices, rarely harm competition and often benefit consumers by increasing demand and/or creating a more efficient distribution channel."), with Steven C. Salop, Sharis A. Pozen & John R. Seward, The Appropriate Legal Standard and Sufficient Economic Evidence for Exclusive Dealing Under Section 2: the FTC's McWane Case 53 (Aug. 7, 2014) (unpublished working paper) (criticizing Commissioner Wright for adopting an approach to economic analysis and the law of exclusive dealing that "would lead to excessive false negatives, under-enforcement and under-deterrence"), available at ssrn.com/abstract=2477448. 70 Easterbrook, supra note 16, at 15 ("When most examples of a category of conduct are competitive, the rules of litigation should be 'stacked' so that they do not ensnare many of these practices just to make sure that the few anticompetitive ones are caught."); Evans & Padilla, supra note 16, at 81-82 ("Practices that generate efficiencies where firms lack market power logically should generate those same efficiencies where firms possess market power. . . . We 18 ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 80
The observation that firms in competitive markets employ certain practices, however, does not preclude the possibility that firms can also use those practices to obtain or maintain market power, and that those practices harm competition on balance when employed by firms exercising market power. 71 Indeed, a recent study of a sample of convicted contemporary international cartels concludes that at least one quarter used vertical restraints to support collusion. 72 Nor does the prevalence of certain practices, particularly exclusionary practices, in competitive markets support an inference that the same practices, when challenged by antitrust enforcers, typically have an efficiency motive, which antitrust enforcement would chill. 73 Even if many or most instances of a practice benefit competition or are competitively neutral, that does not mean that the subset of instances challenged in court (by virtue of facts suggesting the possibility of competitive harm) typically benefit competition on balance, or even benefit competition at all. 74 therefore presume that these practices are procompetitive, even if practiced by firms with monopoly power, unless shown otherwise."). 71 See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 488 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Behavior that might otherwise not be of concern to the antitrust laws-or that might even be viewed as procompetitive-can take on exclusionary connotations when practiced by a monopolist."). For example, the parallel adoption of simplified and common product definitions, of price lists, and of guarantees to buyers that they will get the best price the seller gives any buyer are each practices that firms can use to facilitate coordination; competitive firms, however, can use these same practices to achieve efficiencies. See, e.g., Jonathan B. Baker & Judith A. Chevalier, The Competitive Consequences of Most-Favored-Nation Provisions, ANTI-TRUST, Spring 2013, at 20 (best-price guarantees). Yet it would be inappropriate to infer from the latter observation that rivals are unable to harm competition by fixing prices or dividing markets, or that they do so with such infrequency as to justify relaxing antitrust's concern with collusion. 73 This mistaken inference may underlie recent calls to specify antitrust rules that tilt toward non-intervention; for possible examples, see supra notes 20-22 and infra notes 87-90. 74 The antitrust laws, as enforced today, make it difficult for plaintiffs to prevail in challenging a range of practices that have historically been of concern but that conservative antitrust commentators view as procompetitive. See supra note 12. Under such circumstances, only plaintiffs bringing unusually strong cases are likely to succeed; a paucity of successful challenges therefore provides little basis for identifying the incidence of procompetitive conduct-as distinct from harmful conduct, costly to consumers, that fails to clear the high bar for bringing a successful court case today. But cf. Pauline M. Ippolito, Resale Price Maintenance: Empirical Evidence from Litigation, 34 J.L. & ECON. 263 (1991) (concluding that most resale price maintenance allegations in private litigated cases during a period when the practice was illegal per se were likely weak, but not distinguishing cases in which the practice was one of the plaintiff's primary concerns from those in which it played a supporting role and noting that most government cases with similar allegations settled by consent decree). Moreover, defendants' claims about the efficiencies arising from their conduct may be overstated, particularly when the information needed to verify those claims is largely in defendants' hands. 
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In addition, the empirical evidence underlying the assertion that practices prevalent in competitive markets do not harm competition often comes from settings in which legal rules-including substantive antitrust rules prohibiting anticompetitive instances of the practices at issue-shape firm conduct. 75 Evidence that certain practices often promote competition in these settings, however, provides little information as to whether the same practices would have harmful consequences if antitrust rules constraining their use were relaxed.
To illustrate these points, consider the enforcement and policy implications of studies showing a low incidence of competitive harm arising from vertical restraints. Assuming that the studies correctly measured incidence, 76 their findings might justify an enforcer declining to target for investigation an instance of a vertical restraint that the enforcer selected at random. The low overall incidence, however, would not justify the enforcer declining to target instances of a vertical restraint that the enforcer selected based on additional information suggesting competitive harm. 77 Furthermore, a low incidence of competitive harm in the sample would not supply a basis for supplanting the existing rule governing vertical restraints with a rule of per se legality. The low incidence would not do so because it is susceptible of two explanations: harmful conduct may be rare because firms cannot readily use vertical restraints to harm competition, or it may be rare because antitrust rules have deterred firms from using vertical restraints to harm competition. 75 Other relevant background institutions include, for example, antitrust rules governing burdens of proof and remedy determination, the procedural rules governing litigation, state unfair competition laws, and laws granting intellectual property rights. Unless an empirical study compares settings with and without antitrust rules, 78 or provides some other basis for ruling out the deterrence explanation, the study cannot demonstrate (identify in the econometric sense) the competitive impact of the business practices that conservatives have targeted for antitrust abandonment. Studies in which all observations of the competitive effects of a practice come from settings in which antitrust rules constrain the ways in which firms employ that practice supply no information about the ways that firms would employ that practice in the absence of those rules. Hence, such studies cannot support proposals that antitrust should discard rules prohibiting that practice.
A recent unpublished study addressed this methodological issue and highlighted the role that antitrust rules play in deterring firms from using vertical restraints to harm competition. 79 The study compared states retaining per se illegality for resale price maintenance after Leegin (because of state law) with 78 A review of litigated cases involving resale price maintenance claims from 1976 to 1982 found that a collusive explanation for the practice rarely appeared plausible while an efficiency explanation invariably appeared plausible. Ippolito, supra note 74, at 292. (Ippolito did not consider anticompetitive exclusion, though her data show that monopolization was rarely alleged in addition to vertical price fixing. Id. at 270.) Ippolito's study does not account for the background influence of antitrust rules on firm conduct, given that the legal prohibition on resale price maintenance did not vary over her sample period, id. at 266, so it does not address the identification issue.
The results of a comprehensive review of empirical studies as of 1983 were far from definitive. THOMAS R. OVERSTREET, JR., RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE: ECONOMIC THEORIES AND EM-PIRICAL EVIDENCE (FTC Bureau of Econ. Staff Report, 1983), available at www.ftc.gov/sites/ default/files/documents/reports/resale-price-maintenance-economic-theories-and-empirical-evidence/233105.pdf. The majority of studies referenced were price surveys, which cannot discriminate between procompetitive and anticompetitive theories because they do not also study output. Id. at 106. Overstreet also surveyed case studies evaluating the impact of resale price maintenance on individual products. In general, the case studies he reviewed addressed the identification problem (by comparing settings with and without antitrust rules prohibiting the practice), but were limited to a single product. Overstreet found the case studies "more useful than the far more numerous 'survey' studies" in identifying probable welfare effects, but observed that they did not uniformly point in one direction. states in which that practice would be reviewed under the rule of reason. 80 The study used Nielsen consumer panel data to analyze changes in the prices and quantities sold for over 1000 categories of branded consumer products. 81 In the 15 states in which the rule of reason standard was most likely to apply, the study found that, when prices changed, they were usually higher, and output usually lower, than in the nine states in which the per se standard was most likely to apply. 82 While resale price maintenance would likely lead to higher prices whether it promoted or harmed competition, the greater reduction in output observed in the rule of reason states indicates that resale price maintenance typically harmed competition in the products studied. 83 This study suggests that the rule of reason did not deter anticompetitive uses of resale price maintenance that the per se rule deterred. 84 The study's findings are consistent with the view that anticompetitive explanations for resale price maintenance tend to predominate over procompetitive explana-
Case of Distilled Spirits in the United States, 36 J. INDUS. ECON. 1 (1987) (evidence of output reduction inconsistent with efficiency theories).
A survey of 12 published empirical studies of the welfare effects of privately imposed vertical restraints generally (exclusive dealing, exclusive territories, tying, resale price maintenance, and sourcing restrictions) found that most benefited consumers or at least did not harm them. Francine Lafontaine & Margaret Slade, Exclusive Contracts and Vertical Restraints: Empirical Evidence and Public Policy, in HANDBOOK OF ANTITRUST ECONOMICS, supra note 77, at 391, 406-08 (discussion of table 10.2). But this survey did not evaluate whether the methodologies in the referenced articles addressed the identification issue highlighted here. 80 MacKay & Smith, supra note 79. 81 Id. at 12-13. Product "modules" (categories) included "light beer" and "sleeping aids." Id. at 13. 82 Id. at 15-17. 83 Industry output is a better indicator of the competitive consequences of minimum resale price maintenance than are industry prices because the practice may raise price regardless of whether it promotes or harms competition. (Under the leading procompetitive theory, the price increase reflects higher product quality or improved service, quality-adjusted prices fall, and industry output increases.) The most likely interpretation of a price increase combined with an output reduction across the group of branded retail products analyzed is the one adopted by the study's authors: that competition was harmed on average. Id. at 3, 16, 17-18. It is possible, however, that total output fell, yet consumers in aggregate benefited. This could have happened, for example, if infra-marginal purchasers valued point-of-sale services induced by resale price maintenance a great deal while marginal purchasers did not value such services much. 84 The study did not determine systematically whether manufacturers of branded consumer products employed resale price maintenance in the states where they were not necessarily prevented from doing so. Some likely did, however; the study reports anecdotal evidence to that effect and notes that a number of products in the sample were sold by manufacturers that had allegedly used resale price maintenance in the past. Id. at 4-5, 10, 13 & n.36. Moreover, the results reflect the combined consequences of conduct that would be treated as resale price maintenance under the Sherman Act (including finding an agreement between the manufacturer and distributor) and conduct that has a similar effect but could not have been challenged. It measures the consequences of a more permissive legal environment for all practices that may have been chilled by the per se prohibition against resale price maintenance. Id. at 10.
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tions. 85 This conclusion is at odds with the views of conservative commentators about the likely competitive effects of vertical practices, including resale price maintenance. 86 The contemporary conservative authors who have drawn the problematic inference that practices prevalent in competitive markets do not harm competition have deployed that inference, among other things, to oppose an "aggressive enforcement policy" attacking vertical restraints (both non-price restraints and resale price maintenance); 87 to support a rule of reason analysis that evaluates tying "in a manner that puts a high burden of proof on the plaintiff"; 88 to support antitrust's use of a "hard to satisfy" test for plaintiffs in predatory pricing cases; 89 and to support per se legality for new product intro- 85 Hence, the study's results caution against abandoning antitrust law's concern with resale price maintenance. . The findings of a third study suggest that exclusive dealing has harmed competition in the beer industry. The study, which addressed the identification issue by exploiting differences in rules across states and within states over time, found that beer sales were lower when rules permitted distributors to engage in exclusive dealing. See Jonathan Klick & Joshua D. Wright, The Effects of Vertical Restraints on Output: Evidence from the Beer Industry 20-21 (Nov. 17, 2008) (unpublished working paper), available at www.utexas.edu/law/wp/wp-content/uploads/centers/clbe/ wright_effects_of_vertical-restraints.pdf. 87 See Cooper et al., supra note 21, at 662 (an aggressive policy could only be justified by relatively large costs of false negatives). 88 Hylton & Salinger, supra note 20, at 514. These authors further recommend that the plaintiff "be required to show (subject to a high standard of proof) that tying is profitable to the defendant only if it has an exclusionary effect, and that the cost of tying to the defendant is likely to be recouped through its exclusionary impact." Id. at 514 n.138. See also Evans & Padilla, supra note 16, at 95 (recommending a "structured rule of reason" approach to tying that requires plaintiffs to show that "[o]ffsetting efficiency benefits are insubstantial" in order to prevail). 89 Kobayashi & Muris, supra note 8, at 153. Kobayashi and Muris observe that "little" of the post-Chicago School theoretical modeling demonstrating the possible rationality of predatory pricing has been incorporated into antitrust law, and explain that observation by applying an error cost model: "Absent specific evidence regarding the plausibility of these theories, the courts . . . properly ignore such theories." Id. at 166. Their argument gives no weight to recent empirical literature that finds examples of successful price predation during eras in which en-
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TAKING THE ERROR OUT OF "ERROR COST" ANALYSIS 23 ductions and unconditional refusals to share intellectual property. 90 These analyses together make a flawed case for downplaying the anticompetitive potential of exclusionary conduct, thereby undermining a core concern of antitrust. 91 
B. ERRONEOUS ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT INSTITUTIONS

Erroneous Judicial Precedents Are More Durable than the Exercise of Market Power
In arguing that the costs of false positives outweigh those of false negatives, antitrust conservatives often highlight the supposed durability of erroneous judicial precedents. "If the court errs by condemning a beneficial practice," Judge Easterbrook wrote, "the benefits may be lost for good" through the precedential effect of the judicial decision. 92 Judge Easterbrook was particularly concerned by erroneous Supreme Court decisions, 93 presumably because lower courts' errors of law are frequently corrected on appeal. 94 
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The claim of temporal asymmetry-that bad precedents take longer to dissipate than market power-is hard to credit. 95 Erroneous precedents may not disappear overnight, but nor do cartels or single-firm dominance. It took seven years for the Supreme Court to overrule Appalachian Coals implicitly, 96 and ten years for it to overrule Schwinn explicitly. 97 Yet these lengths of time are roughly comparable to the typical duration of cartels cut short by antitrust enforcement, and, in consequence, less than cartels' likely duration if market forces were the sole mechanism for correction. 98 the Court itself. 101 The instances in which the Supreme Court has overruled its own antitrust decisions, the range of mechanisms available for correcting bad court decisions, and the Supreme Court's thoroughgoing adoption of the Chicago School's academic critique of Court precedents that defined antitrust doctrine during the 1970s 102 all call into question Judge Easterbrook's claim that erroneous judicial precedents, even from the Supreme Court, are more permanent than monopolies and cartels, which can last for decades. 103 
Antitrust Institutions Are Manipulated by Complaining Competitors
Antitrust conservatives also claim that antitrust enforcement institutions make false positives too likely and too expensive, at least with respect to exclusionary conduct violations and cases brought on behalf of classes of consumers. If true, this claim could justify setting a higher bar for establishing those types of cases. There are three main difficulties with this claim, however: it overstates the ability of complaining rivals to manipulate antitrust institutions by alleging anticompetitive exclusion, as discussed in this section; it exhibits oddly selective skepticism about the ability of courts to distinguish 101 The Supreme Court's decision in Dr. Miles, which took nearly a century to overturn, was limited substantially after seven years by United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919), which allowed well-counseled firms to engage in resale price maintenance by announcing a price-maintenance policy in advance and applying it without deviation to discounting dealers. Moreover, during a period when the Supreme Court likely considered the precedent treating resale price maintenance as illegal per se to be wrongly decided, but before the Court overruled that precedent, it raised the burden of proof for plaintiffs in Monsanto Co. v 585 (1985) , as "at or near the outer boundary of § 2 liability"). If an erroneous precedent that discourages efficient conduct is construed narrowly, its adverse impact may be muted, as the affected firms may find other ways to achieve the desired efficiencies at little additional cost. See Devlin & Jacobs, supra note 16, at 98 ("[F]irms foreclosed by judicial error from adopting the very best behavior will adopt the next-best behavior, or may even discover a superior one. The loss to society is the difference in value between the best and second-best-a difference that can be very small or even positive."). 102 Even commentators opposed generally to the Chicago School's program have conceded that the Supreme Court properly reformed prior rules to address ways in which they discouraged firms from achieving efficiencies. E.g., Robert Pitofsky, Does Antitrust Have a Future?, 76 GEO. L.J. 321, 323-25 (1987) (finding "much wrong with the overly active antitrust enforcement policies of the 1960s" and commending the Supreme Court for moving "cautiously and thoughtfully in the direction of more lenient antitrust policies" since the mid-1970s through decisions that were "generally more solicitous toward claims of efficiency"). 103 between conduct that harms competition and conduct that benefits competition, as discussed in the next section; and it reflects a one-sided evaluation of the possible transaction costs of private litigation, as discussed in the section that follows.
According to Judge Easterbrook, "The books are full of suits by rivals for the purpose, or with the effect, of reducing competition and increasing price." 104 Such suits, he wrote, impose unnecessary costs and, "given the unavoidable number of erroneous decisions in antitrust cases, the suits bring condemnation on useful conduct." 105 To address the problem, he recommended treating lawsuits brought by horizontal competitors "with the utmost suspicion" 106 and "generaliz[ing]" the antitrust injury doctrine 107 to curtail litigation by plaintiffs who would be harmed if the conduct they challenged promoted competition. 108 Following the latter prescription, the antitrust injury doctrine has expanded over time, 109 providing courts with a basis for dismissing much of the litigation that concerned Judge Easterbrook in 1984. Suits by terminated dealers, one of Easterbrook's particular concerns, 110 have also been limited by Supreme Court decisions that circumscribed the ability of terminated dealers to challenge resale price maintenance. 111 In the judgment of Herbert Hovenkamp, a leading mainstream antitrust commentator, "while anticompetitive decisions were once relatively common, they are much less frequent today." 112 Antitrust conservatives nevertheless continue to suggest that a disproportionate number of cases alleging exclusion, particularly those against dominant firms, lack merit. Conservatives claim that these cases are often brought by inefficient and unsuccessful rivals or, when brought by the enforcement 2015] TAKING THE ERROR OUT OF "ERROR COST" ANALYSIS 27 agencies, instigated by such rivals. 113 The main concern is with false positives: if such suits are in fact common 114 and if complaining rivals bringing bad cases tend to have more influence over the enforcement and judicial processes than the wrongly accused defendants, then enforcers will bring unwarranted cases and courts will systematically find violations when they should not, chilling procompetitive dominant-firm conduct. In addition, conservatives could then say, if the courts do not stop such cases, even efficient rivals would have an incentive to commence baseless actions alleging exclusion to discourage vigorous competition from the competitors they name as defendants.
This concern states what is at best an implausible hypothesis. 115 There is no reason to suspect that unsuccessful rivals enjoy systematically better access to the enforcement agencies, or exert systematically greater influence on them or on the courts, than do large firm defendants. 116 Moreover, there is no reason to suspect that the agencies and courts are any less able to understand the possible biases of rivals, and to discount their testimony appropriately, than they are able to do the same for other interested parties, such as the alleged excluding firms themselves. 117 Under these circumstances, a low probability of suc- . But the antitrust laws also allow private suits, and some "big cases" against single firm defendantsmost notably, in recent years, Microsoft-can take on outsize importance. 115 The assertion that the enforcement agencies are systematically manipulated by complaining rivals also inappropriately discounts or ignores internal institutional checks within agencies, including layers of internal review and the independent institutional roles of agency economists and lawyers, and discounts or ignores the external constraints imposed on agencies by the prospect of judicial review. On the role of the FTC's Bureau of Economics in "placing a cost-benefit focus on every decision," see Jonathan B. Moreover, if the courts are subject to systematic manipulation by complaining competitors, one would not expect to see them adopting legal rules that under-deter harmful practices. Yet, they have done so. For example, until the Supreme Court stepped in, 119 the lower courts consistently ruled in favor of pharmaceutical firm defendants that employed "pay for delay" settlements to prevent the entry of generic rivals, 120 and adopted legal standards that largely insulated such settlements from antitrust lawsuits. 121 In addition, some appellate courts have viewed exclusive dealing as presumptively lawful when (2010) , available at www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/pay-delay-howdrug-company-pay-offs-cost-consumers-billions-federal-trade-commission-staff-study/ 100112payfordelayrpt.pdf.
121 E.g., FTC v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1312 (11th Cir. 2012) (holding that, "absent sham litigation or fraud in obtaining the patent, a reverse payment settlement is immune from antitrust attack so long as its anticompetitive effects fall within the scope of the exclusionary potential of the patent"), rev'd sub nom. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223. The excluded, and hence potentially complaining, rival in such a case is the second generic competitor to file an application challenging the brand-name firm's patents, as the first-filer generally defends its settlement with the brand-name firm. The most sustained court challenges to these practices were not brought by complaining excluded rivals, but by the Federal Trade Commission or by classes of contracts have short terms, 122 and perhaps when excluded firms retain alternative, albeit less efficient, means of reaching customers. 123 To the extent that courts and prospective litigants understand these presumptions as nearly impossible to rebut in practice, 124 and thus as tantamount to conclusions of law, anticompetitive conduct would again be under-deterred. This dangerous possibility appears to be receding, however, with recent appellate decisions finding that plaintiffs have established anticompetitive harm from exclusive dealing arrangements. 
Courts Cannot Tell Whether Exclusionary Conduct Harms Competition or Promotes It
Some antitrust conservatives question enforcement against anticompetitive conduct on the ground that courts are often unable to make the detailed factual assessments required under the Sherman Act to determine whether conduct 123 See Allied Orthopedic, 592 F.3d at 996-97 (questioning whether rivals were foreclosed when the challenged conduct provided an incentive as opposed to a requirement for exclusivity); Omega Environmental, 127 F.3d at 1163 ("If competitors can reach the ultimate consumers of the product by employing existing or potential alternative channels of distribution, it is unclear whether such restrictions foreclose from competition any part of the relevant market."). Judge Bork recognized that foreclosure could in theory (might "conceivably") occur through disruption of optimal distribution patterns, but suggested that anticompetitive outcomes were implausible. See BORK, supra note 1, at 156 (noting "limits" set by the costs that such tactics impose on the firms employing them and a "further complication" arising from the capacity of the behavior involved to create efficiencies). 124 Cf. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE § 10.9e, at 487 n.55 (4th ed. 2011) ("[T]he trend is toward approval of shorter term exclusive dealing contracts, particularly where there are multiple contracts with different parties so contracts come up for rebidding frequently."); 1 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTI-TRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 217 (7th ed. 2012) (listing practices found permissible "when they do not preclude competing sellers from selling to the buyers on whom the arrangements have been imposed"); GAVIL ET AL., supra note 25, at 851 ("today it is rare for a court to strike down" exclusive dealing).
125 United States v. Dentsply Int'l, 399 F.3d 181, 185, 193 (3d Cir. 2005) (exclusive dealing harmed competition even though the distribution arrangements were "essentially terminable at will" and some manufacturers without distribution agreements were able to stay in business by relying on direct sales); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 366-67 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc) (per curiam) (upholding monopolization claim when exclusive-dealing arrangements raised entry barriers by denying rivals access to the most important distribution channels, without denying rivals access to all such channels).
